here is that migration has not slowed down, which makes matters even worse than Barro predicted. While the population in West Germany is growing, it is shrinking in East Germany. The differential of the population growth rates (excluding Berlin) is 1%, whether one calculates it for 1991 to 2004 or just for the last five of these years.
To investigate the issue of inner-German migration further, I have examined regional data available from the Statistisches Bundesamt. Germany is divided into 439 "Kreise" or regions, including the city states Berlin and Hamburg. For each Kreis, each year from 1995 to 2003 and several age groups, data is available on reallocations crossing the border of the Kreis.
Furthermore, for 2003, detailed population data is available. The data lists the names for each Kreis. Whenever it contained the word "Stadt", the German word for city, I have categorized the "Kreis" as a city, otherwise as countryside, although much of it is presumably also serving as larger suburbs for the cities. I have categorized cities with a total population in 2003 of more than 100.000 as large cities. The population splits 80-20 between West and East, and 28%, 3% and 68% across large cities, small cities and countryside.
While all groups tend to leave East Germany, except for the above-50-year olds, the most striking pattern results for the 18-29 year old, i.e. the future work force, see figure 1 . There is an exodus of these people in particular from small cities and rural East Germany, in contrast to the pattern in West Germany. On average for the last five years in the data, 1.9% of the 18-29 year old left East Germany excluding Berlin for Berlin and West Germany. This is not compensated by middle-age families with young children: the 30-49 year old are also, on net, leaving albeit at a slower rate. about 1.5% to 2% of this age group is leaving there every year, and their migration appears to accelerate rather than slow down. Additionally, the birth rates per female in East Germany from 1991 to 2004 is only about two thirds of the (already low) birth rate in West Germany, and only slowly catching up. It appears that East Germany is slowly but surely aging and dying, except for a few vibrant core areas and big cities.
Furthermore, the slow convergence of the East to the West should surprise more than usual. The disparity between East and West Germany is not the result of many years of a gradual drifting-apart -as is the case for the regions analyzed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Rather, here are two parts of the same country, one of which has been held back artifically during the postwar years. This is similar to the distinction between risk-averse agents self-selecting into civil service job in West Germany and former East Germans being given a civil service job in East Germany, a distinction exploited by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) to calculate the impact of risk aversion on occupational choice. What is therefore needed is a theory consistent with the following stylized facts. There is persistent migration from East to West Germany, in particular by the age group 18 to 29. Unemployment in East Germany is higher than in West Germany. Wages are lower in East Germany. Average labor productivity is lower in East Germany. The welfare system provides for comparable benefits in East and West Germany to short-and long-term unemployed workers. There have been and continue to be sizeable fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. Legal and educational differences between East and West Germany are minor.
A model of regional labor markets, network externalities and migration.
A standard labor search model would predict that the initially higher unemployment in the East should attract relatively more vacancy creation than in the West. Migration would provide for an additional valve. Something more is required to make the differences persist.
I therefore extend the standard labor search model to allow for migration as well as network externalities of production. I closely follow the notation and exposition of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), section 4. I will only study steady-state equilibria with constant shares of each type of worker in the population of the region, and therefore leave away time subscripts, unless necessary, and I need to be careful in formulating the assumptions in order for a steady state to exist. The model is described as a partial equilibrium in the sense that the destination region for migration is not modelled explicitely, but it will be obvious at the end how this could be done.
For the network externalities, consider a match of a worker and a firm. In isolation, production is assumed to be y m (m for "match"). I assume that it is beneficial for this pair to join a network of enterprises and specialize on some specific task. Thus, as part of a network, the production by this pair is now assumed to be y n > y m (n for "network"). Joining a network is probabilistic.
I assume that this probability depends on the ratio of non-networked firmworker-pairs m t to networked firm-worker pairs n t : this turns out to make the model fairly tractable. Thus, let ν = ν(m t /n t ) be the instantaneous probability for a non-networked firm-worker match to become part of some network of firms. Division of labor is beneficial to all: so, the larger the networks, the better. There is no rivalry in joining a network. Furthermore, the more networks are already present, the larger shall be the chance of an unmatched firm to join one. I therefore assume that ν(·) is decreasing. For simplicity, I assume that ν = ν h > 0 for m t /n t ≤ ψ and 0 ≤ ν = ν l < ν h for m t /n t > ψ and some value ψ > 0, satisfying
where λ is the exogenous job separation rate for (networked) firm-worker matches. I shall write ν, keeping in mind, that this can take one of the two values. I will calculate the equilibrium for a "guess" for ν and then determine ν with the equilibrium ratio of m t to n t . The emergence and importance of clusters in East Germany has recently been studied and documented in Rosenfeld et al. (2004) .
For the migration part, I assume that agents have the option of moving from the region under consideration to some other outside region. Agents experience a disutility κ > 0 from moving, expressed in wage-equivalent units.
I assume that a new disutility level κ ′ is drawn iid from some distribution F (κ) at the rate φ. Let U be the value to an unemployed worker in the region under consideration ("East Germany") and letŪ be the value to an unemployed worker in the destination region ("West Germany"). Upon receiving a new draw of the disutility κ, the worker will move, iff U ≤Ū − κ.
Let κ * be value, for which equality is achieved. This modelling assumption can be seen as a rather stylized way of capturing the fact that young people find it easier to move than older people for a variety of reasons, such as family considerations, social networks or habits. With this interpretation, the probability φ is the probability of "rebirth", with an age ( parameterized as moving disutility) randomly drawn from the population distribution. I shall ignore the immigration term, and approximate it per ι = 0 for simplicity. In a match, continuous bargaining assures that the worker receives a share 0 < θ < 1 of the joint remaining surplus from production, which I denote with S m for matched, but not yet networked firm-worker pairs, and S n for networked firm-worker pairs. I assume that there is an exogenous separation rate λ, regardless of whether the match is networked or not. I assume that workers and firms discount the future at rate r.
Analysis and Results
The value of being unemployed is given by
is the "option value" of moving to the outside region. It depends on U via the cutoff-level κ * =Ū − U . Equation (2) shows that the possibility of moving to another region is tantamount to increasing the benefit level b tõ
since the option value of moving increases the value of being unemployed.
As in equation (43) shown that the matching rates α e and α w satisfy
is an average of the labor productivities. Given ν, this equation amounts to a fixed point problem in κ * . One can show that there is a unique fixed point as a continuous function of φ for φ near zero.
Equation (3) shows, that a lower networking rate ν and a larger migration rate φχ(κ * ) both have the effect of discouraging job creation, decreasing the job matching rate α w for workers and increasing the vacancy filling rate α e for firms. A lower job matching rate α w decreases the value of being unemployed U and consequently increases the migration treshold κ * , i.e.
makes emigration more likely.
For the dynamics of the population of workers, I shall concentrate on parameter values so that only unemployed workers find it beneficial to move, if they draw a low value for the moving cost. The rate of population decrease is given byπ
whereũ is the (constant-in-the-steady-state) unemployment rateũ = u/π.
With a nontrivial migration treshold F (κ * t ) > 0, the population decreases forever at a constant rate: migration does not cease.
It remains to solve for the networking rate ν. A solution to the equations above exists both for ν = ν h and ν = ν l . Letn t be the rate of change inñ t , the population share of networked workers. The equilibrium ratio of m t to n t is given by imposingn t = 0 in the equation
With (1), the calculated equilibrium is consistent with the step function assumed above for ν = ν(m t /n t ), provided φ or F (κ * ) is sufficiently small.
A graphical representation of equation (6) is provided in figure 2 . There are two equilibria relevant for my discussion. The "highly networked" equilibrium (point W, for "West Germany") is the equilibrium, in which ν = ν h , unemployment is low, and average labor productivityỹ(ν) is high. In a full general equilibrium, this equilibrium ought to characterize the destination region ("West Germany", "vibrant city", "industrial core") for migrants, thus fixingŪ . In that region, there is no outward migration. The "weakly networked equilibrium", given by point E in figure 2 , is the network with ν = ν l , high unemployment and persistent emigration. One may want to think of this equilibrium as characterizing "East Germany" or, generally, a dying region. The two equilibria balance two offsetting forces. The relatively higher unemployment in equilibrium E attracts more vacancy creation than in equilibrium W. However, the surplus from production is lower in the E equilibrium, due to the lower networking rate, discouraging vacancy creation. Interestingly, for large enough values of φ, the equilibrium E disappears. Likewise, the highly networked equilibrium W may disappear with a high rate of immigration (which we have ignored in the analysis above), as this triggers the creation of many new non-networked firm-worker pairs, overloading the capacity of existing networks to integrate new members. The two other solutions to (6), shown as points A and B in figure 2 , require additional differences between the two regions.
The networking externality gives rise to a coordination failure in this model, see e.g. the survey by Cooper (1999) . The coordination failure is slightly unusual, though, in that it is not a collective failure of firms to decide in favour of networking, but rather a problem of congestion. The model does not imply any obviously sound policies to move from the weakly networked equilibrium to the highly networked equilibrium. Representation of the Dynamics for the fractionñ of networked firm-worker pairs as a function of the ratio of non-networked to networked firm-worker pairs, m/n. The equilibrium E ("East Germany") exhibits low average productivity, high unemployment and persistent emigration, compared to the equilibrium W ("West Germany").
